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COMPLICITY IN BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
James G. Stewart *
ABSTRACT
These remarks, delivered on April 9, 2015 at the American Society of
International Law’s Annual Conference, address the context of complicity
discussions in public international law generally then their significance
and scope in Business and Human Rights in particular. The Panel on
which I delivered this talk was one of the first to discuss the topic of
complicity across different fields, including International Criminal Law,
the Alien Tort Statute, Business and Human Rights and the Public
International Law of State Responsibility. In my comments, I offer five
initial points contextualizing these discussions for the field of public
international law writ large, then five more about their significance for
Business and Human Rights as a discourse. In the first part I suggest that
a robust discussion about complicity is vital if we are to lead decent
ethical lives in a world that is at once increasingly interconnected and
very dysfunctional. In the second, I problematize the use of international
criminal law to supply the standards for complicity Business and Human
Rights should employ. I suggest that negligence, not normally sufficient
for criminal responsibility, should ground the standard for accomplice
liability in the human rights context. Overall, I posit the idea of a tiered
wall of complicity standards that are attuned to the conceptual precommitments of the fields they operate in, not a monolithic system that
takes international criminal law as the sole determinant of the concept.
Nevertheless, even if a coherent system of complicity along these lines
never emerges across international law as a whole, the mere fact that we
are discussing the topic improves our chances of leading ethically decent
lives in this our very imperfect world.

*

Dr James G. Stewart, Associate Professor, Allard School of Law, University of British
Columbia. See www.jamesgstewart.com
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Complicity in Business and Human Rights
Thank you very much for the invitation to speak here today. It’s a great
pleasure for me to be on a panel with a set of distinguished scholars whose
work I admire and respect.
I want to divide the time allotted to me into two parts. In the first part I
want to offer five points that contextualize our discussions about
complicity today, then in the second part, I'd like to turn to complicity in
business and human rights in particular.
Let me begin with my five contextual points in part one.
First, complicity is a form of attribution. Forms of attribution, or modes of
liability as they are also known, can be fairly arid, technical, technocratic
things, that aren’t normally of much interest to international lawyers. I
wanted to depict them in a way that highlights their great regulatory
potential on an international plane. If you think of all of the harms in the
world on the one hand, then all of the actors operating globally on the
other, modes are attribution are those devices that exist between these two
positions, reaching into the ocean of actors to tie them to particular
atrocities. So, one can understand how these mediating concepts can have
huge implications for global governance, even though they’re cast in fairly
technocratic language.
Second, complicity is just one mode of attribution, that makes up a far
wider set that also have important implications for the actors I'm speaking
about, namely businesses. I wanted to mention this at the outset because
there is an occasional tendency in this discourse to conceive of corporate
responsibility for international law violations as coterminous with
complicity. That view is a mischaracterization of the full scope of
potential liability and a part of my hope is that in discussing complicity
now, we do not lose sight of the need for a much thicker understanding of
the relationship between modes of attribution generally and business in
this our increasingly globalized world.
Third, I often use a metaphor to describe what's at stake with complicity
globally and why I sense it holds such importance for the future of
international law. Complicity goes to the heart of our attempts to live
decently in a world that is characterized by, first, great interconnectedness
born of globalization, and second, enormous dysfunction. Complicity is
especially important as a legal and ethical concept that delineates how we
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as individuals, businesses, and states should comport ourselves to lead
decent lives in this very imperfect interconnected world. And because our
points of connection are likely to intensify with the technological advance
that drives globalization, complicity is likely to take on a new importance
for international law moving forward.
Fourth, I believe that just having these sorts of discussions about
complicity is a net gain for the world. In her book On Violence, Hannah
Arendt points out that the absence of a robust pacifist discourse in the
world bodes ill for the ways in which we are likely to use force. By the
same token, the absence of a robust discourse about complicity
undermines our chances of living decent lives in the world as presently
constituted. For that reason, discussions about complicity are to be
welcomed, even and perhaps especially, where they involve differences of
opinion, deep skepticism, and outright critique.
Fifth, there is a real need for discussions among international lawyers
about the ways in which complicity functions across the different subfields of the discipline, as we have done I think for the first time in this
panel today. What's interesting about the role of complicity across the
Alien Tort Statute litigation, within international criminal justice, in
business and human rights, as well as to some extent at least, in the public
international law rules governing state responsibility is the extent to which
international criminal law has been used as the benchmark that permeates
all understandings. As I will mention in just a moment, it's not evident to
me that international criminal law should be used in this way, or that
complicity should mean the same thing across all the sub-components of
public international law we are discussing today.
So with these contextual points established, let me move to the second
part of my presentation, where I discuss the role of complicity in business
and human rights in particular.
To begin, I want to spoil the plot a little by suggesting that complicity
should be disaggregated across all of these different fields such that it
means something much more permissive of accountability in business and
human rights. Although I think this is an area of great importance for
future research, my tentative thoughts at this stage are that international
law should present a tiered wall of complicity that involves a hierarchy
between the different types of standards that are attuned to the conceptual
pre-commitments of the fields they operate in. I’ll concretize what I mean
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by speaking to you about the history of complicity in business and human
rights in particular
In the year 2003, the UN Sub-Commission on the Human Rights adopted
the Draft Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and
other Business Enterprises with Regards to Human Rights. These draft
norms did not meet with a great deal of approval thereafter, and in 2005
Professor John Ruggie was appointed as Special Representative to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations to move forward with a quite
different approach to these issues. As things transpired, Professor Ruggie
abandoned the Draft Norms and began anew, in part because of
differences of opinion about complicity. I’d like to offer a slightly
divergent view about the way complicity should function in business and
human rights that I think charts a third possible way.
Let me start with the idea of a “sphere of influence.” Spheres of influence
were a key component of the understanding of complicity announced in
the Draft Norms. As originally conceived, the concept served two
functions: first, it established the circumstances whereby corporations
would be responsible for their contributions to downstream human rights
violations others carried out with their help. A corporation wouldn't be
responsible for all remote consequences of their actions, only those
consequences that were in their sphere of influence. Second, this idea of
spheres of influence delimited the relationship between corporations and
states, with human rights law continuing to view the latter as its primary
guarantors.
In rejecting the Draft Norms because of their use of this notion of spheres
of influence in its concept of complicity, Professor Ruggie rightly pointed
out that spheres of influence had no legal pedigree. But when one looks to
the legal concept that actually does this work in the law of complicity, i.e.
the term that does have legal pedigree, it turns out that it is so complicated
as to be unworkable as a guide for everyday businesses, and ultimately,
that spheres of influence may be a fairly good proxy for what the real legal
standard is. In reality, the question is whether businesses make substantial
causal contributions to human rights violations, and that question is
complicated by the fact that an overdetermined causal contribution,
namely one where there are multiple sufficient causes for a harm, must be
sufficient as a basis for responsibility. The intricacies of this relation have
troubled philosophers since Hume.
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Instead of getting into this complexity, spheres of influence would seem to
be a fairly workable approximation of the core issues in the theory of
causation. In this sense, the standard within the Draft Norms is arguably
well suited to business and human rights as a practical enterprise.
Relatedly, the mental element required for complicity in business and
human rights was initially understood as being knowledge. This
knowledge standard drew heavily on a particular reading of international
criminal law, but again Ruggie rightly pointed out that there are numerous
competing mental elements for complicity depending on where one looks.
In many international courts and tribunals, knowledge is actually
interpreted as recklessness. In civil law jurisdictions there is a concept of
dolus eventualis, which is significantly more permissive of these sorts of
cases than is knowledge. In some jurisdictions there are references to
purpose as a mental element for complicity, and finally it's possible to
think of the mental element as dynamic in the sense that it mirrors the
mental elements required in the crime with which the accomplice will be
prosecuted, which differ from crime to crime. In my view, this is the
situation with the ICC Statute.
What do we make, then, of this great diversity in mental element standards
for complicity? Well, I just want to seize on the ICC standard to highlight
how a transposition of international criminal law into international human
rights law simply can't work as seamlessly as people seem to have
supposed. If one accepts my interpretation that complicity in the ICC
Statute involves (at least) two mental elements, purpose initially going to
the form of assistance and then a second set of mental elements that derive
from the crime with which the accomplice is charged, then this standard
does not easily fit within international human rights law, which very
seldom announces mental elements in the context of human rights norms
businesses may become complicit in. In other words, the structural
differences between criminal law and human rights law mean that
complicity can’t just be copied and pasted between systems.
In any event, which mental element for complicity should we choose in
the business and human rights context? In my view, the answer should be
none of the above. In my opinion the mental element for complicity in
business and human rights should be negligence. While negligence would
be too low a standard for criminal responsibility, it seems appropriate in
the business and human rights context because it ties responsibility for
human rights to a failure to perform the due diligence requirements that
businesses already have to carry out for their shareholders. In other words,
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people often ask me about the fact that a business should have known that
they were engaging or furthering human rights violations, whereupon I tell
them that should have known means negligence and that generally
negligence is insufficient for criminal responsibility. But why should it not
be appropriate as a gateway to compensation to those affected by
corporate implication in human rights violations?
Those, then, are my reflections on complicity in business and human
rights and their place within a variegated, tiered system in public
international law. As I say, one would think that international law would
do well to get its house in order on issues of complicity given the relative
shift from direct violation of international law precepts to the ways in
which individuals, businesses, and states will increasingly be complicit in
international law violations. Nevertheless, even if a coherent system of
complicity never emerges across international law as a whole, the mere
fact that we are discussing the topic improves our chances of leading
ethically decent lives in this our very imperfect world.
My kind thanks to the organizers for the invitation to speak today.

